CVE-2026-14763: Remote SQL Injection in PHP Reservations

Detection and hunting guidance

Detection should focus on requests to /admin/tour_reserves.php or equivalent installed paths, especially POST requests carrying suspicious values in the tour parameter. Since the reported technique is time-based blind SQL injection, defenders should also look for a pattern of repeated requests with unusual latency deltas, often in 3-, 6-, or 15-second increments if an attacker is following public examples.

In many environments, web access logs alone may not conclusively prove exploitation, because the malicious payload can be URL-encoded and the application may still return HTTP 200 responses. The combination that matters is: access to the vulnerable endpoint, anomalous parameter values, and corresponding backend or application response delays. If database audit logging is enabled, watch for use of SLEEP( or logically unnecessary subqueries tied to requests hitting this page.

Because this is a PHP application, defenders should also inspect custom app logs, reverse-proxy logs, and WAF telemetry. If the application sits behind Apache or Nginx, a burst of POST requests to the same administrative page from a single IP with varying tour values is a strong lead. If you have no logging on the app today, that itself is a gap worth correcting immediately while the issue is under triage.

Technical Notes

Example access-log pattern to search for:

POST /admin/tour_reserves.php
POST /ht/admin/tour_reserves.php
tour=(select(0)from(select(sleep(
tour=%28select%280%29from%28select%28sleep%28

Example grep-based hunt on a Linux web server:

grep -RIE 'tour_reserves\.php|sleep\(|tour=%28select|tour=\(select' /var/log/apache2/ /var/log/nginx/

Example Splunk query:

(index=web OR index=apache OR index=nginx)
(uri_path="/admin/tour_reserves.php" OR uri_path="/ht/admin/tour_reserves.php")
(method=POST)
(tour="*sleep(*" OR request_body="*sleep(*" OR request="*tour=%28select*")
| stats count min(response_time) max(response_time) values(src_ip) by uri_path, http_status

Example Sigma-style matching logic concept for a WAF or proxy pipeline:

detection:
  selection_path:
    cs-uri-stem:
      - "/admin/tour_reserves.php"
      - "/ht/admin/tour_reserves.php"
  selection_body:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - "sleep("
      - "select("
      - "tour="
  condition: selection_path and selection_body

Mitigation and patching

The most important limitation here is simple: no confirmed official fixed version number is available from the supplied primary references. That means there is no verified statement such as “affected: <=1.0, fixed: 1.0.1” that can be responsibly published based on current evidence. The only confirmed affected version in the provided material is 1.0, and the fixed version is unknown.

In the absence of a documented vendor patch, defenders have two immediate options: remove or restrict exposure and apply code-level remediation. If the application is internet-facing, place it behind IP allowlists, VPN-only access, or disable the vulnerable page entirely until the query handling is fixed. If the application is business-critical and must remain available, a WAF rule targeting the tour parameter and blocking SQLi syntax may reduce risk, but it should be treated as a temporary control rather than a substitute for code fixes.

The coding remediation pattern is straightforward: convert any SQL statement using the tour parameter into a prepared statement with strict type handling. The advisory’s example binds tour as an integer, which aligns with what defenders should want here. In addition, validate server-side that tour is an expected identifier, reject malformed values early, and avoid dynamic query construction with concatenated request input.

If you maintain the code locally, verify the vulnerable file directly and update the query implementation. If this application was deployed from a downloaded project archive rather than a managed package, traditional package-manager patch workflows may not exist. In that case, remediation must be handled as an application code change under your own change-control process.

Technical Notes

Example secure PHP pattern:

<?php
$tour = filter_input(INPUT_POST, 'tour', FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);
if ($tour === false || $tour === null) {
    http_response_code(400);
    exit('Invalid tour id');
}

$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM tour_reserves WHERE tour = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("i", $tour);
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
?>

If you need an immediate temporary workaround, restrict access to the file at the web server layer.

Apache example:

<Files "tour_reserves.php">
    Require ip 192.0.2.0/24
</Files>

Nginx example:

location = /admin/tour_reserves.php {
    allow 192.0.2.0/24;
    deny all;
}

If the app is deployed under /var/www/html/ht, a practical change workflow may look like:

cd /var/www/html/ht/admin
cp tour_reserves.php tour_reserves.php.bak-2026-07-05
vi tour_reserves.php
php -l tour_reserves.php
systemctl reload apache2 || systemctl reload nginx

If you use Git to manage local app code:

git checkout -b hotfix/cve-2026-14763
git diff
git add admin/tour_reserves.php
git commit -m "Fix CVE-2026-14763 with prepared statement for tour parameter"

Practical response checklist

First, identify whether you actually run Hotel and Tourism Reservation in PHP 1.0 anywhere in your environment, including forgotten demo systems, staging hosts, or low-cost shared hosting used by business units. Small PHP reservation apps are often deployed outside central asset management, so discovery may require checking web roots, VM inventories, and hosted cPanel environments.

Second, determine exposure. If the application is publicly accessible, treat it as a higher-priority incident response and hardening task. Preserve relevant logs, hunt for requests targeting tour_reserves.php, and review database access patterns for suspicious timing or unusual reads. If suspicious traffic is found, consider the possibility of credential theft and review database user privileges, application config files, and any stored secrets.

Third, fix or contain. Because the fixed version number is unknown, the safest wording is not “upgrade to version X,” but rather “remediate the vulnerable code path and limit exposure until verified safe.” Once remediated, test the endpoint to confirm that non-integer or SQLi-style tour inputs are rejected and no longer produce timing-based delays.

References

• NVD CVE record: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14763
• CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
• Public advisory and PoC: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anubhavv106/Security-Advisories/refs/heads/main/Hotel-Tourism-Reservation-tour_reserves.php-SQLi.md
• code-projects.org: https://code-projects.org/
• VulDB reference listed by NVD: https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-14763