CVE-2024-23564: HCL Aftermarket EPC Password Recovery Flaw
TL;DR - Critical HCL Aftermarket EPC business logic flaw in password delivery workflow. - Invalid users may redirect password emails if the vulnerable flow is exposed. - Patch details are not publicly confirmed from retrieved sources, so prioritize vendor guidance and compensating controls.
Vulnerability at a Glance
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2024-23564 |
| CVSS | 9.1 (Critical) |
| Attack vector | Network, based on the described application workflow exposure |
| Privileges required | None apparent from the NVD description |
| Patch available | Vendor bulletin exists, but specific fixed version was not confirmed from retrievable source content |
CVE-2024-23564 is a critical business logic vulnerability in HCL Aftermarket EPC. The NVD description states that a non-valid user can obtain passwords from the server and redirect them to their own email address by manipulating the server response. That makes this more than a generic account enumeration issue: the reported outcome is credential disclosure via a flawed password-delivery workflow.
For defenders, the key point is that this is not described as memory corruption, injection, or remote code execution. It is a workflow validation failure in a password-recovery or password-send process. Those flaws can be harder to catch with generic vulnerability scanners because the vulnerable condition depends on request sequencing and inconsistent validation between steps.
What Is This Vulnerability?
According to the NVD description, HCL Aftermarket EPC validates the supplied UserId in initial requests but does not apply equivalent validation to later email-related requests when sending passwords to user email addresses. That inconsistency creates a gap in the account recovery flow. An attacker who is not a valid user may be able to manipulate the application response path so the server sends passwords to an attacker-controlled email address instead of the legitimate user.
Technically, this fits the class of business logic vulnerabilities and broken identity validation in multi-step workflows. The system appears to treat one stage of the transaction as authoritative, then fails to re-check identity or destination integrity when handling the password-delivery step. In practical terms, the application may trust client-influenced state or server responses too much after the first request succeeds or returns a certain status.
This kind of flaw is especially serious in products that still send recoverable passwords, or that expose password reminders rather than one-time reset links. If the product behavior truly allows passwords to be obtained and redirected, impact can include direct account compromise, lateral movement into connected business systems, and persistent access if the account is privileged or reused across environments.
The root cause is therefore best understood as inconsistent validation and authorization in the password recovery chain. Defenders should review not only this specific CVE but also adjacent account recovery, user lookup, and notification endpoints for similar assumptions about trusted state between requests.
Who Is Affected?
The confirmed affected product is HCL Aftermarket EPC. That product association is supported by the NVD record and corroborated against the vendor support reference linked from NVD. However, the retrievable advisory content available during research did not expose the bulletin body in a way that confirmed detailed version metadata.
Affected version ranges: not confirmed from retrievable primary-source content.
Fixed version number: not confirmed from retrievable primary-source content.
That uncertainty matters operationally. If you run HCL Aftermarket EPC and cannot immediately confirm version applicability from an authenticated vendor portal, asset inventory, or direct HCL support communication, the safest assumption is that any internet-accessible or broadly reachable instance may require review. This is particularly important if the deployment exposes password recovery, “forgot password,” or account lookup functionality to unauthenticated users.
Because exact version boundaries are unavailable from the retrieved sources, defenders should not assume they are unaffected simply because they are on a recent build. Instead, verify against HCL’s official bulletin KB0131787 or a support case, identify all deployed EPC environments, and determine whether the vulnerable password-delivery behavior is present in test or production. In environments where the application is business-critical and vendor confirmation is delayed, compensating controls are warranted.
CVSS Score Breakdown
NVD assigns this issue a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1, which places it in the Critical range. The exact vector string was not available in the retrieved material, so any component-by-component interpretation beyond the known score must be treated as an informed assessment rather than a quoted vendor or NVD vector.
Based on the published description, the attack appears consistent with a network-reachable, low-complexity workflow abuse issue that does not require valid privileges. That would align with the statement that a “non valid user” can trigger the condition. If the password recovery flow is exposed over HTTP(S), the vulnerable path may be reachable remotely with only crafted requests and manipulated transaction state.
The likely impact is high because the described outcome is password disclosure or password delivery redirection. In CVSS terms, that strongly suggests high confidentiality impact. Integrity and availability impacts are less clear from the public description. However, practical risk remains severe even if the primary outcome is only credential disclosure, because exposed credentials can lead to full session takeover and downstream abuse.
Where the official vector is unavailable, teams should focus less on theoretical scoring nuance and more on exploit preconditions. Ask: Is password recovery exposed? Does the application email passwords or password reminders? Can email-related requests be modified directly? Is there auditing for password delivery events? Those answers are more useful for prioritization than debating a single CVSS metric.
Exploitation Status
At the time of writing, active exploitation in the wild is not confirmed from the sources retrieved for this article. The CVE is not listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog based on the research note provided. That means there is no CISA KEV due date or federal remediation mandate attached to this CVE as of 2026-07-17.
Likewise, a public proof of concept is not confirmed from the materials available for this task. No verified exploit repository, write-up, or vendor-supplied reproduction steps were identified in the source set used here. That does not mean exploitation is impossible or unlikely. Business logic flaws are often straightforward to reproduce once the vulnerable workflow is understood, especially by anyone with application access, traffic captures, or experience testing recovery endpoints.
For practitioners, the correct statement is:
- PoC public: Not confirmed
- Active exploitation: Not confirmed
- CISA KEV listed: No
In the absence of confirmed exploitation data, defenders should assume opportunistic testing is still possible, particularly for internet-facing deployments. Critical-severity authentication workflow bugs are attractive targets because they may provide direct account access without malware or noisy exploit chains.
How to Detect It
Detection should focus on the password recovery workflow, especially sequences where an unauthenticated client initiates a password-related action and the email destination changes unexpectedly. Because the public description points to manipulation of the server’s response and weak validation in email requests, review HTTP access logs, reverse proxy logs, and application audit trails for abnormal password email events.
Start by identifying all endpoints involved in account recovery: user lookup, email verification, password send, password reminder, or reset notification. Then look for repeated attempts against many user identifiers, mismatched email destinations, or rapid multi-step sequences from the same IP or session. If the application logs both the requested UserId and the destination email, any divergence between expected user-email mapping and actual delivery target should be treated as suspicious.
Also look for activity from unauthenticated sessions invoking endpoints that should only be reached after successful identity verification. In many business logic cases, the exploit path is visible as an out-of-order sequence: step 2 or step 3 gets called directly, or a client replays a request with modified state parameters.
Technical Notes
Example HTTP access log patterns to investigate:
POST /forgotPassword
POST /password/send
POST /user/recovery/email
POST /account/recover
Search for repeated unauthenticated requests from the same source:
grep -Ei 'forgotPassword|password/send|recovery/email|account/recover' /var/log/nginx/access.log
If logs include POST bodies or structured fields, look for mismatched identity and email values:
event=password_recovery userId=jdoe destinationEmail=attacker@example.org auth=anonymous
event=password_send userId=customer123 destinationEmail=external_mailbox@proton.me result=success
Example Splunk query for suspicious recovery activity:
index=web OR index=app
("forgotPassword" OR "password/send" OR "recovery/email" OR "account/recover")
| stats count values(uri_path) values(userId) values(destinationEmail) values(src_ip) by session_id
| where count > 3 OR mvcount(destinationEmail) > 1
Example Sigma-style detection idea for web logs:
title: Possible abuse of password recovery workflow in HCL Aftermarket EPC
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-stem|contains:
- "/forgotPassword"
- "/password/send"
- "/recovery/email"
condition: selection
level: medium
If you lack detailed application telemetry, compensate at the network edge. Flag bursts of POST requests to recovery endpoints, especially when they originate from IPs that have no successful login history or that enumerate many user IDs in short time windows.
Mitigation and Patching
The preferred remediation is to apply the vendor-provided fix for HCL Aftermarket EPC. However, the specific fixed version number could not be confirmed from the retrievable primary-source content used for this article. Similarly, affected version ranges were not publicly confirmed in the available source material. The responsible action is to consult HCL’s official bulletin KB0131787 through authenticated support access or open a vendor case to obtain authoritative version guidance.
Until you can confirm and deploy the vendor fix, reduce exposure around the password recovery workflow. If operationally possible, disable password reminder or password-send functionality entirely and move users to a reset-token model. If that is not possible, restrict access to EPC recovery endpoints with IP allowlists, VPN-only exposure, reverse proxy access control, WAF rules, or internal-only publishing. For externally accessible deployments, add rate limiting and alerting on all password recovery actions.
You should also review whether the application stores or transmits recoverable passwords. If it does, this CVE is a sign to accelerate a broader redesign: one-time reset links, strong identity verification, destination email integrity checks, and logging for each state transition. Finally, monitor for abnormal password recovery events during and after remediation, and force password resets for accounts that show suspicious recovery activity.
Technical Notes
Because the fixed version is not confirmed, there is no trustworthy upgrade command that can safely name a specific target release. Use your normal HCL update mechanism only after obtaining the exact fixed build from the vendor. In the meantime, concrete workarounds can still be implemented.
Example NGINX reverse proxy restriction for recovery endpoints:
location ~* ^/(forgotPassword|password/send|recovery/email|account/recover) {
allow 10.0.0.0/8;
allow 192.168.0.0/16;
deny all;
}
Example Apache restriction:
<LocationMatch "^/(forgotPassword|password/send|recovery/email|account/recover)">
Require ip 10.0.0.0/8 192.168.0.0/16
</LocationMatch>
Example ModSecurity rule to rate-limit recovery endpoint abuse patterning:
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/(forgotPassword|password/send|recovery/email|account/recover)" \
"id:10023564,phase:2,pass,nolog,initcol:ip=%{REMOTE_ADDR},setvar:ip.pwrecover=+1,expirevar:ip.pwrecover=60"
SecRule IP:PWRECOVER "@gt 10" \
"id:10023565,phase:2,deny,status:429,log,msg:'Excessive password recovery requests'"
Operational mitigation checklist:
- Identify all EPC instances and exposed recovery endpoints.
- Confirm applicability with HCL support and retrieve the fixed version.
- Restrict unauthenticated access to recovery workflows until patched.
- Review logs for redirected or anomalous password email events.
- Reset credentials for potentially affected accounts and enforce MFA where available.
References
The primary public source for the vulnerability description is the NVD entry for CVE-2024-23564. It provides the canonical summary that the flaw affects HCL Aftermarket EPC and involves missing validation on email-related requests in the password-delivery flow. It also assigns the issue a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.1.
A vendor advisory URL is referenced by NVD, but the retrievable content available during research did not expose the bulletin body in a way that allowed verification of affected versions or the fixed release. For that reason, this article intentionally avoids inventing version ranges or patch numbers. If you operate HCL Aftermarket EPC, obtain those details directly from HCL support before planning production changes.
- NVD CVE detail: CVE-2024-23564
- HCL support bulletin reference: KB0131787
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: CISA KEV
For further reading on related vulnerabilities, check out our articles on CVE-2026-25555 and CVE-2026-56451.
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